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I.  Introduction 
 
 Ronald Guy was an at-will employee of Mutual of Omaha insurance 
company (“Mutual”) from June 1992 until April 1995.1  He served as the general 
manager of Mutual’s Memphis division and his duties included the recruitment, 
training, and management of Mutual’s agents in Western Tennessee.2  In September 
1992, Jerry Roberson applied to become an agent for Mutual.3  Before Guy finished 
reviewing Roberson’s application, Mutual assigned Roberson an “agent production 
number” and an “agent’s kit.”4  In December 1992, Roberson visited Doris Johnson 
and represented himself as an agent of both Mutual and John Hancock Insurance 
Company.5  During that visit, Roberson sold Johnson a Mutual annuity in exchange 
for a stock certificate and checks payable to Mutual worth about $70,000.6  He then 
deposited the checks into his personal account, retained possession of the stock 
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1 Guy v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 79 S.W.3d 528, 531 (Tenn. 2002).   
 
2 Id. 
 
3 Id. 
 
4 Id.  The parties disputed whether Mutual ever officially hired Roberson as an agent.  Id.   
 
5 Id. 
 
6 Id. 
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certificate, and began mailing Johnson “annuity checks” which where actually written 
on Roberson’s personal checking account.7   
 
 When Guy learned of this transaction, he suspected theft and reported the 
incident to the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance.8  He did not 
report the incident to Mutual until October 13, 1994 because until then he was not 
aware that Roberson had represented himself as a Mutual agent.9  On November 4, 
1994 Guy received a positive evaluation and salary increase from Mutual, but on 
December 20, 1994 Mutual reduced Guy’s salary by half and reduced his bonus 
income by 25 percent.10  This reduction in compensation came four days after 
Mutual agreed to reimburse Doris Johnson for the $63,781.72 in losses she suffered 
due to Jerry Roberson’s fraudulent annuity sale.11  Mutual fulfilled this agreement in 
February 1995 when it delivered an annuity in the amount of $63,781.72 to Doris 
Johnson.12  On March 1, 1995, Guy was placed on “written notice” and his bonus 
income was further reduced by 20 percent.13  Guy’s supervisor explained that Guy 
was placed on “written notice” due to his “‘lack of judgment’ in (1) his failure to 
report the Roberson incident to Mutual when he reported it to state authorities, and 
(2) his mishandling of [an earlier] sexual harassment complaint [made by a female 
Mutual agent against one of Guy’s subordinates].”14  Mutual terminated Guy’s 
employment on April 19, 1995 due to his “unacceptable performance as 
demonstrated by failure to use judgment consummate with the position of General 
Manager.”15  Mutual never mentioned, as a reason for Guy’s discharge, Guy’s report 
to the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance regarding Jerry 
Roberson’s fraudulent activity.16   
                                                 
7 Id. 
 
8 Id. at 531-32.   
 
9 Id. at 532.   
 
10 Id.   
 
11 Id. 
 
12 Id. 
 
13 Id. at 532-33.   
 
14 Id. at 532. 
 
15 Id. at 533.   
 
16 Id.   
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 A month later, Guy filed suit against Mutual alleging a common law cause of 
action for retaliatory discharge in violation of Tennessee state public policy.17  He 
asserted that his report of Roberson’s fraudulent activity to the Tennessee 
Department of Commerce and Insurance was a substantial factor in Mutual’s 
decision to discharge him.18  In support of this allegation, Guy argued that he did not 
receive negative work evaluations until Mutual accepted liability for Roberson’s 
fraudulent activity.19  Mutual responded by arguing that Guy’s cause of action was 
preempted by the Tennessee Public Protection Act, which requires a whistle-blower-
plaintiff to prove that his or her whistle-blower activity was the sole motivating 
reason for the plaintiff’s discharge.20  Thus, Mutual filed a motion for summary 
judgment arguing that Guy could not prevail in the case because he could not prove 
that his reporting of Roberson’s activity was the sole motivation behind his 
discharge.21   
 
 The trial court refused to grant the motion, but did not provide any 
reasoning to support its decision.22  Mutual received permission to seek an 
interlocutory review, and the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the Tennessee 
Public Protection Act did preempt Guy’s common law cause of action for retaliatory 
discharge in violation of Tennessee’s public policy to protect whistle-blowers.23  The 
Court of Appeals also held, however, that Guy could still pursue a common law 
retaliatory discharge claim under an alternative public policy violation—Tennessee’s 
                                                 
17 Id.   
 
18 Id. at 536.  In Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., 762 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. 1988), the Tennessee Supreme 
Court first recognized as a legitimate cause of action a plaintiff’s claim for retaliatory discharge when 
the plaintiff’s refusal to participate in or remain silent about illegal activities was a substantial factor in 
the employer’s decision to discharge the plaintiff.   
 
19 Guy, 79 S.W.3d at 533.   
 
20 Id. at 535; see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (Supp. 2004) (stating that “[n]o employee shall be 
discharged or terminated solely for refusing to participate in, or for refusing to remain silent about, 
illegal activities”) (emphasis added).  The Tennesseee Public Protection Act, also called the Tennessee 
“Whistle-blower” Act, was enacted in 1990.  Guy, 79 S.W.3d at 535.   
 
21 Id. at 533.   
 
22 Id.  
 
23 Id. at 533-534.   
  
 
450 TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 6  
  
public policy to protect consumers from unethical insurance agents.24  Under this 
alternative theory, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was sufficient evidence 
for a jury to find that Guy’s reporting of Roberson’s fraud was a substantial factor in 
Mutual’s discharge decision.25  The Tennessee Supreme Court then granted an appeal 
“to consider whether the ‘Whistleblower’ statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304, 
preempts the common law cause of action for retaliatory discharge when an 
employee is discharged for reporting illegal or unethical activity.”26   
 
II.  The Emergence of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine in Tennessee 
 
“[M]en must be left, without interference to . . . discharge or retain 
employees at will for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause without 
thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se.”27  With these words the Tennessee 
Supreme Court adopted the employment-at-will doctrine in 188428 in Payne v. Western 
& Atlantic Railroad Co.29  The employment-at-will doctrine presumes that employees 
who are not hired for a definite period of time are at-will employees and can thus be 
discharged by their employers without cause or notice.30  Although Tennessee was 
                                                 
24 Id. at 534.  The Court of Appeals noted as evidence of this public policy Tennessee Code 
Annotated § 56-6-155.  Id.  This section authorizes the Commissioner of Commerce and Insurance to 
“suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue or renew any [insurance agent’s] license” if the licensee or 
prospective licensee engages in various listed unethical activities.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-6-155 
(2000).  It also authorizes the Commissioner to assess civil penalties amounting to between $100 and 
$1,000 for each violation.  Id.   
 
25 Guy, 79 S.W.3d at 534.   
 
26 Id.   
 
27 Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884), rev’d on other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 
S.W. 134, 137 (Tenn. 1915).  Employment-at-will is also “a right which an employee may exercise in 
the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause or want of cause as the employer.”  Id. at 518-19.   
 
28 Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment 
At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679, 764, 772 (1994) (verifying that Payne was the first application of the 
employment-at-will doctrine in Tennessee).   
 
29 81 Tenn. 507 (1884). 
 
30 Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment-At-Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 118 
(1976).  In Tennessee this rule even applies to employees granted permanent employment.  Combs v. 
Standard Oil Co., 59 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Tenn. 1933).   
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not the first state to formally adopt the doctrine,31 its expression of the doctrine is 
certainly one of the most memorable.32  Ironically, the case did not involve wrongful 
discharge, but rather involved an alleged tortious interference with business 
relationships.33   
 
Payne was the owner of a business located near the center of five railroad 
termini leading into Chattanooga.34  This business had become quite profitable 
selling goods to employees of the railroad, who worked in Chattanooga and along 
the five rail lines.35  This came to an end, however, when the railroad threatened to 
fire any employee who did business with Payne.36  Payne filed suit arguing that the 
railroad used the threat of discharge to intimidate his customers and maliciously ruin 
his business.37  The court stated that Payne would be entitled to recovery only if the 
railroad’s threats of discharge were unlawful, and those threats could only be 
unlawful if the railroad did not have the right to discharge its employees for doing 
business with Payne.38  The court upheld the railroad’s right to discharge its 
employees with the following reasoning: 
 
Railroad corporations have in this matter the same right enjoyed by 
manufacturers, merchants, lawyers and farmers. All may dismiss their 
employe[e]s at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or 
                                                 
31 Morriss, supra note 28, at 699.  By 1884 seven states had already adopted the employment-at-will 
doctrine: Louisiana (1808), Maine (1851), Mississippi (1858), Wisconsin (1871), California (1872), 
Illinois (1874), and Colorado (1876).  Id.   
 
32 See Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At-Will:  The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 653, 
653 n.4 (2000) (describing the Payne court’s language as “a classic exposition on the employment-at-
will rule”); Frederick J. Lewis & Jeffery A. Jarratt, Revisiting the Tennessee Employment-At-Will Doctrine—
What is the Exception and What is the Rule?, 19 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 171, 171 (1989) (describing the Payne 
court’s language as “the exemplification of the American common law rule”).   
 
33 Payne, 81 Tenn. at 508-11.   
 
34 Id. at 508-09.   
 
35 Id. at 509.     
 
36 Id. at 509-11.   
 
37 Id. at 514.   
 
38 Id. at 517. 
  
 
452 TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 6  
  
even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal 
wrong. A fortiori they may “threaten” to discharge them without thereby 
doing an illegal act, per se. The sufficient and conclusive answer to the 
many plausible arguments to the contrary, portraying the evil to 
workmen and to others from the exercise of such authority by the great 
and strong, is: They have the right to discharge their employe[e]s. The 
law cannot compel them to employ workmen, nor to keep them 
employed. If they break contracts with workmen they are answerable 
only to them; if in the act of discharging them, they break no contract, 
then no one can sue for loss suffered thereby. Trade is free; so is 
employment. The law leaves employer and employe[e] to make their own 
contracts; and these, when made, it will enforce; beyond this it does not 
go. Either the employer or employe[e] may terminate the relation at will, 
and the law will not interfere, except for contract broken. This secures to 
all civil and industrial liberty. A contrary rule would lead to a judicial 
tyranny . . . .39 
 
What is interesting about the reasoning expressed here is that the Tennessee 
Supreme Court did not cite H.G. Wood’s famous treatise on master-servant law40 
nor any case law as authority for the rule.  Instead, the court based its adoption of 
employment-at-will on the principle that courts should not interfere with the 
contractual and economic liberty of those involved in the employment relationship.41  
                                                 
39 Id. 519-20.   
 
40 The event that has been traditionally credited with placing employment-at-will on the path toward 
dominance was its adoption by the legal treatise writer H.G. Wood.  The significance of Wood’s 
treatise has been questioned.  Morriss, supra note 28, at 697-98 (arguing that Wood’s treatise was 
relatively insignificant because “only a third of the common law adopters between 1880 and 1900 
cited Wood”).  In his 1877 treatise on master-servant law Wood clearly expressed the doctrine: 
 
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, 
and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it 
by proof. . . .  [U]nless their understanding was mutual that the service was to extend for a 
certain fixed and definite period, it is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of 
either party, and in this respect there is no distinction between domestic and other servants. 
 
H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272 (1877).   
 
41 Payne, 81 Tenn. at 519-20.  The emergence of a general theory of contract and the prevalence of 
laissez faire economics inspired the creation of the employment-at-will doctrine.  Feinman, supra note 
30, at 124-27.  Beginning in the 1870’s, a general theory of contracts was developed by legal theorists, 
such as Langdell, Holmes, and Williston, which came to dominate legal thinking in the late nineteenth 
century.  Id. at 124.  Under contract law, individuals were given the freedom to voluntarily assume 
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The court expressed a desire to protect “civil and industrial liberty” from “judicial 
tyranny.”42  The majority recognized the potential burden that this doctrine might 
place on employees, but addressed this only by saying, “[t]he law cannot compel 
[employers] to employ workmen, nor to keep them employed.”43  Justices Freeman 
and Turney, however, dissented44 and anticipated that this doctrine would eventually 
require exceptions: 
 
The principle of the majority opinion will justify employers, at any rate 
allow them to require employe[e]s to trade where they may demand, to 
vote as they may require, or do anything not strictly criminal that 
employer may dictate, or feel the wrath of employer by dismissal from 
service. Employment is the means of sustaining life to himself and family 
to the employe[e], and so he is morally though not legally compelled to 
submit. Capital may thus not only find its own legitimate employment, 
but may control the employment of others to an extent that in time may 
sap the foundations of our free institutions. Perfect freedom in all 
legitimate uses is due to capital, and should be zealously enforced, but 
public policy and all the best interests of society demands it shall be 
restrained within legitimate boundaries, and any channel by which it may 
                                                                                                                                     
legal obligations and design the terms of the relationships that would exist among them.  Id.  The 
common law would serve only as a foundation that individuals would build on to construct their own 
private law, which would emanate from the intent of the parties.  Id.  This trend of legal independence 
was complemented by the laissez faire economic and political thought which was prevalent during this 
time.  Id.  Thus, these trends granted individuals greater freedom in their legal and economic affairs 
and changed perceptions of the employer-employee relationship.  Id. at 124-25.  This relationship was 
increasingly perceived as a limited commercial relationship instead of a long-term domestic 
relationship.  Id. at 125.   
 
Contract theory’s emphasis on the intent of the parties affected the presumptions governing 
indefinite employment contracts.  Under the old English rule an indefinite employment contract was 
presumed to be for a year and this presumption was based not on the intent of the parties but on the 
needs and customs of the community.  Id. at 119-20.  Now presumptions would have to be inferred 
from the intent of the parties and this new approach led to the employment-at-will doctrine.   
 
42 Payne, 81 Tenn. at 519-20.   
 
43 Id.   
 
44 Id. at 528.   
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escape or overleap these boundaries, should be carefully but judiciously 
guarded.45 
 
However, it would be a hundred years before the Tennessee Supreme Court would 
adopt a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine.46   
 
III.  The Emergence of the Public Policy Exception in Tennessee 
 
Although the dissent in Payne anticipated that public policy exceptions would 
be needed to contain some of the negative side effects of the employment-at-will 
doctrine,47 it was one hundred years before the Tennessee courts would establish 
such an exception.48  The birth of Tennessee’s public policy exception occurred in 
Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co.,49 in which the Tennessee Supreme Court first recognized a 
cause of action for retaliatory discharge.50  The plaintiff in Clanton was an at-will 
employee who was injured on the job and subsequently fired the day after she 
reached a full settlement of her worker’s compensation claim.51  The Tennessee 
Supreme Court held that employees discharged in retaliation for filing a worker’s 
compensation claim would be permitted a cause of action against the employer 
because such an action was “necessary to enforce the duty of the employer, to secure 
the rights of the employee[,] and to carry out the intention of the legislature.”52  The 
court also held that in similar, future cases successful plaintiffs would be allowed to 
recover punitive damages.53   
                                                 
45 Id. at 543-44.   
 
46 Lewis, supra note 32, at 175.   
 
47 Payne, 81 Tenn. at 543-44.   
 
48 Lewis, supra note 32, at 175.   
 
49 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984).   
 
50 Id. at 445; Carl A. Pierce, The Tennessee Supreme Court and the Struggle for Independence, Accountability, and 
Modernization, 1974-1998, in A HISTORY OF THE TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT 270, 291 (James W. Ely 
Jr. ed., 2002).   
 
51 Clanton, 667 S.W.2d at 442.   
 
52 Id. at 445. 
 
53 Id.  
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Central to the court’s judgment was its belief that retaliatory discharges were 
implicitly prohibited by section 50-6-114 of the Tennessee Code Annotated, which 
prohibits the use of any “device” which relieves the employer of his obligations 
under the Worker’s Compensation Law.54  The court’s reasoning first looked to the 
Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co.,55 which the 
Tennessee Supreme Court described as “the leading case recognizing a cause of 
action for retaliatory discharge.”56  The special significance of Frampton to the 
Tennessee Supreme Court was that the Indiana Statute prohibiting devices was 
nearly identical to the Tennessee statute.57  The Tennessee Supreme Court thus 
found it highly persuasive that the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the threat 
of retaliatory discharge fell into the category of devices prohibited by the statute.58  
The Tennessee Supreme Court also noted that numerous states had reached results 
similar to those in Frampton under similar statutes.59  In addition, the court mentioned 
that numerous states had granted judicial remedies for retaliatory discharge through 
statutory enactments.60   
 
However, the Tennessee Supreme Court did recognize that several courts 
had refused to follow Frampton because they believed that creating such a cause of 
action should be left to the state legislature.61  Yet, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
disagreed with these courts, arguing that the legislature’s purpose in creating the 
Worker’s Compensation Law was to provide employees with “a certain and 
expeditious remedy” and that “[r]etaliatory discharges completely circumvent this 
                                                 
54 TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-114 (1999) (“No contract or agreement, written or implied, or rule, 
regulation or other device, shall in any manner operate to relieve any employer, in whole or in part, of 
any obligation created by [the Worker’s Compensation Law] . . . .”).   
 
55 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).   
 
56 Clanton, 667 S.W.2d at 443.   
 
57 Id. 
 
58 Id. at 443-44.   
 
59 Id. at 444.  The Clanton court cited cases from Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Nevada, New 
Jersey, and Oregon.  Id.  
 
60 Id.  The states mentioned in this category were California, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, 
Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wisconsin.  Id.  
 
61 Id.  
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legislative scheme.”62  The defense argued that the legislature had “expressly rejected 
an action for retaliatory discharge” when a bill which would have permitted such an 
action was rejected by a Senate committee.63  Neither the full Senate nor the full 
House, however, voted against this bill.64  Thus, the court responded to the defense 
by stating: “We are not persuaded that the action of one Senate committee in 
recommending against passage of the bill constitutes a legislative intent to reject 
actions for retaliatory discharge.”65   
 
The court’s approach is logical.  Although the work of a single Senate 
committee appears to show an intent to allow retaliatory discharges, it would be 
irrational for the General Assembly to permit such discharges.  The General 
Assembly did not exert the effort of creating the Workers’ Compensation Law 
simply to see it eviscerated by the use of retaliatory discharges.  Based on the 
proposition that the General Assembly wanted the Workers’ Compensation Law to 
succeed, it is logical to conclude that retaliatory discharges fall into the category of 
devices prohibited by the General Assembly.  Thus, the creation of an action for 
retaliatory discharge was a reasonable means of protecting the General Assembly’s 
intent.   
 
IV.  The Public Policy Exception and Employer-Endorsed Illegal Activities 
 
A.  A New Exception Emerges in the Tennessee Courts of Appeal 
 
Although Clanton created a public policy exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine, the exception was strictly confined.  The Tennessee Supreme Court 
confined the exception to situations where retaliatory discharge was used in an 
attempt to circumvent the Workers’ Compensation Law.66  The court never outlined 
any general principles that could be used to develop other public policy exceptions to 
                                                 
62 Id. 
 
63 Id. 445.   
 
64 Id.  
 
65 Id.  One commentator has argued that “a contrary argument is equally plausible and perhaps more 
persuasive.”  Lewis, supra note 32, at 179 (“The [Tennessee General Assembly’s] failure to provide for 
a cause of action for retaliatory discharge for the exercise of one’s workers’ compensation rights 
suggests that it did not favor such actions.”).   
 
66 Clanton, 667 S.W.2d at 443-45.   
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the at-will doctrine.67  Nevertheless, there developed a line of cases where plaintiffs, 
who had been discharged for refusing to take part in illegal activities, requested that a 
new exception be permitted for their situation.68   
 
The first of these was Williams v. Tennessee Health Services,69 a case before the 
Tennessee Court of Appeals for the Middle Section in which the plaintiff alleged that 
she was discharged after she refused to falsify insurance reports so that her employer 
could receive unearned revenue.70  The court reversed the lower court’s judgment of 
dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings71 because “the present case 
has the potential to present a record upon which another exception to the 
employment at-will rule might be approved.”72  This holding is surprising considering 
the strict interpretation of the at-will rule that the Middle Section expressed a few 
years earlier in Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc.73  In Whittaker, the court had said: “It is not 
the province of this court to change the law . . . .  That prerogative lies with the 
Supreme Court or with the legislature.  However, . . . any substantial change in the 
‘employee-at-will’ rule should first be microscopically analyzed regarding its effect on 
the commerce of this state.”74  Now, approximately six months after the Tennessee 
Supreme Court’s decision in Clanton, the Court of Appeals for the Middle Section 
stated: “[I]t is the province of this [c]ourt to ascertain and apply the existing law and 
to assist in developing a record from which the ultimate decision can be wisely made 
in regard to any needed change in the law.”75   
                                                 
67 Id.;  Lewis, supra note 32, at 179.   
 
68 See, e.g., Watson v. Cleveland Chair Co., 789 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. 1989); Chism v. Mid-South Milling 
Co., 762 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. 1988); Watson v. Cleveland Chair Co., 1 IER Cases 1780 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1985); Williams v. Tenn. Health Services, 1 IER Cases 1754 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).   
 
69 1 IER Cases 1754 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).   
 
70 Id. at 1755.   
 
71 Id. at 1759.   
 
72 Id. at 1757.   
 
73 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).   
 
74 Id. at 396.   
 
75 Williams, 1 IER Cases at 1757.   
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In Watson v. Cleveland Chair Co.,76 the Tennessee Court of Appeals for the 
Eastern Section went further and held that “a cause of action for retaliatory 
discharge arises when an at-will employee is terminated solely for refusing to 
participate [in], continue to participate [in], or remain silent about illegal activities.”77  
In Watson, the plaintiffs were truck drivers who alleged that they were fired because 
they refused to violate state speed laws and federal rest regulations.78  In its reasoning 
the court mentioned decisions by other jurisdictions that both supported and 
opposed such an extension of the public policy exception.79  In addition, the court 
noted the warning in Whittaker that changes to the employment-at-will doctrine 
could have a negative impact on the state’s ability to attract new businesses.80  After 
considering these authorities, the court concluded that “[s]ince the industry we seek 
to attract and retain are corporate citizens who will respect our laws, we do not 
believe the proposed exception would adversely affect the quality of the lives of our 
citizens.”81   
 
B. Opening Chism’s Exit:  The Tennessee Supreme Court  
Addresses a New Exception 
 
It was not until Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co.82 that the Tennessee Supreme 
Court dealt with a case involving an employee discharged for refusing to participate 
in illegal activities.83  Chism was an appeal arising from the Tennessee Court of 
                                                 
76 1 IER Cases 1780 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).   
 
77 Id. at 1783.   
 
78 Id. at 1781.   
 
79 Id. at 1782.   
 
80  
Tennessee has made enormous strides in recent years in its attraction of new industry of 
high quality designed to increase the average per capita income of its citizens and thus, 
better the quality of their lives.  The impact on the continuation of such influx of new 
businesses should be carefully considered before any substantial modification is made in 
the employee-at-will rule.   
 
Id. (quoting Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981)).   
 
81 Id. at 1783.   
 
82 762 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. 1988).   
 
83 Id. at 553.   
2005] CASE NOTE 459 
Appeals for the Western Section,84 in which the plaintiff alleged he was fired for 
refusing to participate in procedures that allegedly violated the Internal Revenue 
Code.85  The trial court rendered summary judgment for the employer, but the Court 
of Appeals reversed.86  The Tennessee Supreme Court dismissed the case because 
the complaint was not sufficiently specific.87   
 
What is interesting about Chism, however, is not the judgment rendered, but 
the discussion of retaliatory discharge that was included in the opinion.  Although 
the court stated that “the exception cannot be permitted to consume or eliminate the 
general rule[,]”88 it went on to describe general principles governing retaliatory 
discharge that seemed less confining than those established in Clanton.89  Instead of 
confining retaliatory discharge to situations where an employer is attempting to 
circumvent the Workers’ Compensation Law, the Chism court gave the cause of 
action a broader definition in which an employer would be liable for any “clear 
violation [by the employer] of some well-defined and established policy” that was a 
“significant factor in the termination of an at-will employee”90  The court described a 
well-defined, established policy as one “[u]sually . . . evidenced by an unambiguous 
constitutional, statutory[,] or regulatory provision.”91  This description of a well-
defined policy provides a broad subject matter from which to find such policies both 
because it includes regulatory in addition to constitutional and statutory provisions 
and because its use of the word “usually” implies that such policies can even be 
found outside this already broad subject matter.92  The court also listed “[e]xamples 
of clearly defined public policies which warrant the protection provided by this cause 
                                                 
84 Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., 1987 WL 30146 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1987).   
 
85 Chism, 762 S.W.2d at 553-54.   
 
86 Id. at 552-553.   
 
87 Id. at 556-57.   
 
88 Id. at 556.   
 
89 Id.  
 
90 Id.  
 
91 Id.   
 
92 Lewis, supra note 32, at 182.   
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of action.”93  This list included: (i) discharge for refusal to commit perjury, (ii) 
discharge for refusing to ignore a lawful subpoena, (iii) discharge for refusing to 
ignore jury duty obligations, and (iv) discharge for refusing to falsify records or 
participate in the mislabeling of unsafe or defective products.94  By giving a broader 
definition of retaliatory discharge and a list of situations where retaliatory discharge 
would be “warranted,”95 the Tennessee Supreme Court appeared to signal approval 
of a broader interpretation of Clanton.  In fact, when the court dismissed the 
plaintiff’s case in Chism, the court was quick to state: “We do not intend to disparage 
such an action.  The [c]ourt is generally prepared to uphold such claims in 
appropriate cases . . . .”96  Thus, Chism appeared to open an exit through which 
employees could escape some of the dangers of the employment-at-will rule.   
 
C.  Closing Chism’s Exit:  The Tennessee Supreme Court Hesitates 
 
One year later, however, when Watson v. Cleveland Chair Co.97 reached the 
Tennessee Supreme Court in 1989, the court showed little willingness to allow 
Chism’s exit to expand.  As discussed above,98 the plaintiffs in Watson alleged that 
they were discharged for their refusal to violate state speed laws and federal rest and 
speed regulations.99  The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the 
retaliatory discharge claim and held that “a cause of action for retaliatory discharge 
arises when an at-will employee is terminated solely for refusing to participate [in], 
continue to participate [in], or remain silent about illegal activities.”100  In its 
reasoning, the Court of Appeals did not appear to rely on a statutory statement of 
                                                 
93 Chism, 762 S.W.2d at 556.   
 
94 Id.   
 
95 Id. 
 
96 Id. at 557.   
 
97 789 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. 1989).   
 
98 See supra Part IV.A.   
 
99 Watson, 789 S.W.2d at 539.   
 
100 Watson v. Cleveland Chair Co., 1 IER Cases 1780, 1783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).   
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public policy.101  Instead, it relied on “the overriding public policy that the people of 
this state should be encouraged to be law abiding citizens.”102   
 
The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s holding.103  In 
doing so, it stated, “[w]e agree in principle with the expressed views of the lower 
court, however . . . only in the most extraordinary circumstances should the courts of 
this [s]tate impose their judgment in an area which, in the first instance, is clearly a 
legislative function.”104  Thus, the Tennessee Supreme Court interpreted the Court of 
Appeals’ “overriding public policy” as an attempt by the Court of Appeals to declare 
the public policy of the state, which is a role reserved for the legislature.105  The 
Court of Appeals’ “overriding public policy” could not form the basis for a 
retaliatory discharge claim because it was not clearly expressed by a constitutional or 
legislative provision.106  In addition, the federal regulations that the plaintiff was 
allegedly forced to violate could not form the basis for a retaliatory discharge claim 
because state jurisdiction over those regulations was preempted by the Surface 
Transportation Assistance Act.107   
 
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s reversal in Watson did not mean that the court 
was opposed to allowing employees discharged for refusing to condone or 
participate in illegal activities to have a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, it 
only meant that the court was opposed to expanding it beyond Chism.   
 
We have heretofore in this opinion discussed the question of whether a 
cause of action for retaliatory discharge may be maintained when an 
employee at-will is terminated solely for refusing to participate in or 
remain silent about illegal activity.  We have written at some length on 
this issue in [Chism].  We have expressed our accord with the Court of 
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103 Watson, 789 S.W.2d at 540.   
 
104 Id.   
 
105 Id. at 540-41.   
 
106 Id.   
 
107 Id. at 541-44.   
  
 
462 TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 6  
  
Appeals, that a cause of action for retaliatory discharge arises when an at-
will employee is terminated solely for refusing to participate [in], continue 
to participate [in], or remain silent about illegal activities.  However, in 
reference to this case, we believe the plaintiffs’ remedies lie within the 
parameters of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982.  We do 
not agree that it is appropriate for the courts of this [s]tate to establish 
public policy or adopt an exception to the common-law by placing our 
imprimatur thereon in the absence of some constitutional or legislative 
precedent.108 
 
Here the court’s reference to Chism, a case which potentially widened the public 
policy exception, and the court’s claim to be in accord with the Court of Appeals 
implies that the Tennessee Supreme Court would recognize a cause of action under 
such facts, but only if there was an extremely clear expression of public policy from 
the General Assembly.  Even if such a clear expression of public policy exists in a 
particular case, however, the court did not make clear whether an employee’s refusal 
to condone illegal activity must be the sole reason for the employee’s termination 
(the standard expressed by the Court of Appeals) or just a substantial factor (the 
standard in Chism).  Thus, the court in Watson signaled to the General Assembly that 
a clear expression of public policy in support of whistle-blowers was needed, but it 
did not give clear guidance regarding the standards to be used.   
 
If Watson began closing Chism’s exit, Harney v. Meadowbrook Nursing Center.109 
closed it.  In Harney, the plaintiff alleged that she was discharged in retaliation for her 
unfavorable testimony in a former co-worker’s workers’ compensation hearing.110  
The Tennessee Supreme Court dismissed her case because her employer “made no 
attempt to interfere with [her] testimony[,]” but instead had an “honest difference of 
opinion . . . about whether her testimony was true or false.”111  In its reasoning the 
Harney court redefined the holding in Clanton by stating that “Clanton did not create a 
new exception to the [employment-at-will] rule.”112  Instead, the Clanton court merely 
recognized that there was a cause of action implicit within the Workers’ 
                                                 
108 Id. at 544.   
 
109 784 S.W.2d 921 (Tenn. 1990).   
 
110 Id. at 921.   
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Compensation Law that prevented employers from using retaliatory discharge to 
defeat the rights granted to employees by that law.113  Thus, “[t]he [Clanton] decision 
was not intended as a license for the courts to enlarge on the employee-at-will rule or 
create other exceptions to public policy or the common-law in the absence of some 
constitutional or statutory precedent.”114   
 
D.  Chism’s Exit Fully Opens 
 
Following the Watson and Harney decisions, the Tennessee General Assembly 
passed the Public Protection Act of 1990.115  The Act states that “[n]o employee shall 
be discharged or terminated solely for refusing to participate in, or for refusing to 
remain silent about, illegal activities.”116  Thus, the General Assembly expressed a 
public policy in favor of protecting whistle-blowers.117  The Act did little else because 
it adopted the “sole reason” standard mentioned in Watson, which created a cause of 
action only if the employee’s termination was motivated solely by his or her refusal 
to tolerate illegal activity, a standard that would be quite difficult to prove.118   Thus, 
the Tennessee General Assembly reopened Chism’s exit, but only narrowly.   
 
Beginning in 1992 the Tennessee Supreme Court began to change its view of 
the public policy exception with decisions that rejected the views expressed in Watson 
and Harney.  In Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co.,119 the court rejected the Harney 
interpretation of Clanton.   
 
                                                 
113 Id. 
 
114 Id. 
 
115 The Tennessee General Assembly passed the Public Protection Act on March 29, 1990.  1990 
Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 771.  It is codified in the Tennessee Code Annotated at § 50-1-304.  TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 50-1-304 (Supp. 2003).    
 
116 TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304(a) (Supp. 2003).    
 
117 John E. Lippl, Comment: Predicting the Success of Wrongful Discharge-Public Policy Actions:  In Tennessee and 
Beyond, 58 TENN. L. REV. 393, 399 (1991).   
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119 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992).   
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Clanton is not limited to retaliatory discharge actions arising from an 
employee’s exercise of workers’ compensation rights, but rather makes 
the tort action of retaliatory discharge available to employees discharged 
as a consequence of an employer’s violation of a clearly expressed 
statutory policy. . . .   
 . . . . 
. . . [W]e are prepared to recognize a right to recovery for retaliatory 
discharge in cases where an employer violates a clear public policy 
evidenced by an unambiguous statutory provision.120   
 
In fact, the Hodges court went so far as to describe Clanton as the case in which “we 
recognized an exception to [the employment at will] rule.”121  This was a complete 
about-face from the court’s previous statement in Harney that “Clanton did not create 
a new exception to the [employment-at-will] rule.”122   
 
The final step, in rejecting Watson and finally recognizing a new public policy 
exception, came with Reynolds v. Ozark Motor Lines, Inc.123  In Reynolds, the plaintiffs 
were truck drivers who alleged that they were terminated because they refused to 
violate safety regulations adopted pursuant to the Tennessee Motor Carriers Act.124  
Although the trial court had found for the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals reversed, 
arguing that a claim for retaliatory discharge could not be based upon the facts in the 
case because the Tennessee Motor Carriers Act did not “provide any basis for a 
public policy exception to the employment-at-will law of Tennessee.”125  The 
Tennessee Supreme Court disagreed and reinstated the trial court’s judgment.126  The 
court, citing Hodges, Anderson, and Chism, stated that an action for retaliatory 
discharge would “lie where the employer has violated a clear public policy evidenced 
by an unambiguous constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision and the 
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122 Harney v. Meadowbrook Nursing Ctr., 784 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Tenn. 1990).   
 
123 887 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1994).   
 
124 Id. at 823.  The Tennessee Motor Carriers Act is codified in § 65-15-101 of the Tennessee Code 
Annotated.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-15-101 (Supp. 2003).   
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employer’s violation was a substantial factor in the employee’s discharge.”127  The 
court concluded that the Motor Carriers Act was an expression of public policy by 
the state legislature and that all the elements of retaliatory discharge were present in 
the case.128  The Tennessee Supreme Court had finally allowed a plaintiff, who had 
been discharged for refusing to condone illegal activity, to recover for retaliatory 
discharge.   
 
Reynolds was extremely important to the development of a second public 
policy exception to the employment-at-will rule, but it still left some loose ends.  The 
decision was important because it clearly held that a common law cause of action for 
retaliatory discharge was available to employees discharged for refusing to engage in 
or remain silent about illegal activates.  The Reynolds decision was also important 
because it clearly held that Chism’s substantial factor standard, rather than Watson’s 
sole factor standard, was to be used in retaliatory discharge cases dealing with 
employer endorsed illegal activities.129  However, two important questions were not 
fully answered.  First, does the Tennessee Public Protection Act preempt this 
common law cause of action?  The Reynolds court implied that there was no 
preemption, but did not provide an explicit answer to this question.130  Second, has 
the Reynolds holding created a durable new exception to the at-will rule or, like Chism, 
will the Reynolds holding be diluted by subsequent opinions?  Eight years later, in Guy 
v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.,131 the Tennessee Supreme Court would answer both 
of these questions. 
 
V. Guy v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.:   
The Tennessee Supreme Court Verifies Reynolds 
 
 In Guy the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the Tennessee Public 
Protection Act “is cumulative to, and does not preempt, the common law tort 
remedy for retaliatory discharge claims where the employee was discharged for 
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reporting illegal or unethical conduct.”132  In doing so the court also verified that (1) 
Tennessee has a common law cause of action for “retaliatory discharge when the at-
will plaintiff-employee is discharged for refusing to remain silent about illegal 
activities”133 and (2) “[t]he plaintiff in such an action must demonstrate that the 
employer’s violation was a ‘substantial factor in the employee’s discharge.’”134  Thus, 
Guy both clarified and stabilized Tennessee law regarding this type of retaliatory 
discharge claim.   
 
 In an opinion written by Justice Barker, the court first summarized 
Tennessee’s common law regarding retaliatory discharge claims in the context of 
employer endorsed illegal activities.135  The court noted that “Tennessee has long 
adhered to the common law employment-at-will doctrine, which provides that an 
employment contract for an indefinite term is terminable at the will of either the 
employer or the employee for any cause or for no cause.”136  Having stated the 
general rule, Justice Barker further explained that the “traditional at-will rule is not 
absolute,” an employee discharged for refusal to remain silent about illegal activities 
has a cause of action under the common law if he or she can show that such refusal 
was a substantial factor in the employer’s discharge decision.137   
 
The discussion then turned to the Tennessee Public Protection Act of 1990, 
and the court quoted its relevant provisions.138 
 
(a) No employee shall be discharged or terminated solely for refusing to 
participate in, or for refusing to remain silent about, illegal activities. 
 . . . . 
                                                 
132 Id. at 537.   
 
133 Id. at 535.   
 
134 Id. (quoting Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., 762 S.W.2d 552, 557 (Tenn. 1988)) (emphasis added 
by the Guy court).   
 
135 Id. at 534-35.   
 
136 Id. (citing Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884), rev’d on other grounds, Hutton v. 
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(d)Any employee terminated in violation of subsection (a) shall have a cause 
of action against the employer for retaliatory discharge and any other 
damages to which the employee may be entitled.139  
 
According to the court, the goal of the Act was “to protect employees from being 
discharged in retaliation for ‘blowing the whistle’ on infractions of rules, regulations, 
or the law pertaining to the health, safety, and general welfare of the public.”140   
 
Mutual of Omaha insurance company (“Mutual”), the defendant-employer, 
argued that when the Tennessee Public Protection Act was enacted it codified the 
common law cause of action for retaliatory discharge when an at-will employee is 
discharged for reporting illegal activities.141  Mutual further asserted that, because the 
statutory cause of action preempted the common law cause of action, the common 
law’s substantial factor standard was no longer available to plaintiffs.142  Therefore, 
Guy would have to prove that his whistle blowing activity was the exclusive reason 
for his discharge.143   
 
On the other hand, Guy argued that the common law and statutory causes of 
action were cumulative.144  Thus, he was not required to carry the heavy burden 
required in the statute.145  Instead, he could bring his claim under the common law 
cause of action and enjoy its lighter burden of proof, allowing him to recover if he 
could prove that his whistle blowing activity was a substantial factor in Mutual’s 
discharge decision.146   
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 Thus, the Tennessee Supreme Court was forced to decide whether the 
Tennessee Public Protection Act preempted the common law cause of action.  
Justice Barker outlined three arguments supporting the conclusion that the Act did 
not abrogate the common law.147  First, “the clear and plain language of the text 
contains no . . . indication of exclusivity.”148  “[W]here a common law right exists and 
a statutory remedy is subsequently created, the statutory remedy is cumulative ‘absent 
language showing that [it is] intended to be exclusive.’”149  Second, “if the legislature 
had wanted to foreclose a common law cause of action, it had more than ample 
opportunity to do so; indeed, it could have done so . . . in 2000 [when] it amended 
the statute.”150  Third, “close examination of the statute reveals key distinctions from 
the common law tort, further indicating the cumulative, rather than the preemptive, 
nature of the statutory remedy.”151  For example, the statute increased the burden of 
proof to require the plaintiff to show that whistle blowing activity was the sole 
reason for being discharged, and the statute extended protection to public 
employees.152  Based on this analysis the court held “that [the Tennessee Public 
Protection Act] is cumulative to, and does not preempt, the common law tort 
remedy for retaliatory discharge claims where the employee was discharged for 
reporting illegal or unethical conduct.”153   
 
 The court then went on to evaluate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, 
which had denied Mutual’s motion for summary judgment.154  The Tennessee 
Supreme Court agreed with Guy that § 56-6-155 of the Tennessee Insurance Law 
evidenced Tennessee’s public policy to protect consumers from unethical insurance 
agents.155  The court concluded that this was a sufficiently “well-defined and 
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established public policy” to serve as “the basis for [Guy’s] retaliatory discharge 
claim.”156  Finally, the court also concluded that “there [was] a genuine issue of 
material fact with respect to whether Mr. Guy’s whistle blowing activity was a 
substantial factor in Mutual’s decision to discharge him.”157  Thus, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.158   
 
VI.  Conclusion:  The Consequences of Guy 
 
 An important consequence of the Guy decision is that it helped to eliminate 
the uncertainty that arose in the wake of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in 
Watson and the Tennessee Public Protection Act.  The Watson decision created 
uncertainty because it did not clearly state the standard of proof required of the 
plaintiff in the common law cause of action.159  Would it be the substantial factor 
standard from Chism or the sole reason standard developed by the Tennessee Court 
of Appeals?  The Tennessee Public Protection Act created uncertainty by raising the 
possibility of statutory preemption of the common law cause of action and its 
standard of proof.  In Reynolds, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the standard 
of proof in the common law cause of action is the substantial factor standard, but it 
only implied that the common law cause of action was not preempted.160  Guy 
explicitly held that the common law cause of action and its substantial factor 
standard were not preempted.161  Thus, an important consequence of the Guy 
decision was greater clarity.   
 
The most powerful consequence of the Guy decision is that it prevented the 
only remedy available to wrongfully discharged whistle-blower employees from 
becoming a paper tiger.  If the Tennessee Supreme Court had held that the 
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Tennessee Public Protection Act preempted the common law cause of action, all 
whistle-blower plaintiffs would have been forced to carry the exceedingly heavy 
burden of proving that their whistle-blower activities were the exclusive reason for 
their discharge.  This is so difficult to prove that it would have made the cause of 
action practically unavailable to most whistle-blower employees.  After Guy, privately 
employed whistle-blower plaintiffs may now confidently rely on the common law 
cause of action with its lighter substantial factor standard.  Public employees 
discharged for whistle-blowing, however, are left with the paper tiger because the 
statutory cause of action is the only means though which they may assert retaliatory 
discharge claims; the common law cause of action never applied to them.162  Thus, as 
far as public employees are concerned, Guy had no real effect, but for private 
employees, Guy relegated the Tennessee Public Protection Act’s sole reason standard 
to the dustbin of history.   
 
162 Public employees discharged for engaging in whistle-blower activities may not assert the common 
law cause of action for retaliatory discharge.  Williams v. Williamson County Bd. of Educ., 890 S.W.2d 
788, 790 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); Montgomery v. Mayor of Covington, 778 S.W.2d 444, 445 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1988).  Public employee whistle-blowers had no such cause of action until § 50-1-304 was 
amended in 1997.  1997 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 511.   
 
